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CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE-PLAYING THE
GAME IN A BIDDING WAR
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports' are presently undergoing two bidding
wars2 similar to the one fought between the American Football
League (AFL) and the National Football League (NFL) in the late
1950's and early 1960's. 3 The National Basketball Association
(NBA) nad the American Basketball Association (ABA) compete
so fiercely for star players that outstanding collegiate basketball
players are commanding million dollar-plus contracts. The World
Hockey Association (WHA) is embarking on its first season and is
posing a serious threat to the virtual monopoly enjoyed in that
sport on a major league level for the past twenty-five years by the
National Hockey League (NHL).
As in past bidding wars, the contest has not been confined to
the athletic arenas, but has been waged in courtrooms around the
country. There have been innumerable suits by clubs against play-
ers who have jumped league in violation of their contracts. 4 Player
1. With the exception of Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202
Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902), no cases involving baseball are discussed in this
article. This is due to the fact that baseball is the only sport which is
exempt from the antitrust laws. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Be-
cause of the unique status enjoyed by baseball, there have been no great
bidding wars in the sport in modern times. Additionally, baseball con-
tracts are based upon this freedom from antitrust laws and thus contain
provisions such as the true reserve clause, permanently binding a player
to a team, which contracts in the major league sports do not contain.
The Lajoie case is discussed in § IIB, infra, because the principle set
forth in it has been applied to other cases.
2. Normally an athlete can offer his services only to one team
within one league and must accept the price offered by that team or not
play. Periodically, however, new leagues have been formed to challenge
the older league's monopoly in the sport. With two buyers on the market
the athlete finds that he can command a higher price. The competition
between the two leagues to get the best athlete by paying the highest
prices is referred to as a bidding war.
3. The bidding war between the AFL and NFL ended in 1966 when
they were granted exemption from the antitrust laws for the purpose of
merging. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1967). This exemption was only for the pur-
pose of merger, however, and the NFL remains subject to the antitrust
laws for all other purposes. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4. See § II infra.
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associations have filed suits' against leagues to prevent certain al-
leged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.6 Because of this
litigation, the manner in which athletic contracts are written and
enforced is undergoing changes in each of the major professional
sports. A bill to exempt a proposed merger between the NBA and
ABA from the Sherman Act has been reported out of committee in
the United States Senate,7 but it contain sa provision which would
make illegal the use of any reserve or option clauses beyond the
rookie year.8 The WHA has become the only major league to in-
troduce a contract which contains neither an option nor a reserve
clause. 9 The NFL Players Association has filed suit against the
NFL in Minneapolis, contending that the so-called "Rozelle Rule" 10
whereby a player who has played out his option may join a new
club only if that new club makes compensation to the old club,
is a violation of the Sherman Act.'1
This Comment will examine the contractual rights and duties
of players under the present system of contractual relations be-
tween clubs and players and discuss how these rights would be
more fully protected if certain proposed changes were to be insti-
tuted.
II. DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO THE PLAYER WHO HAS JUMPED
LEAGUES AND IS BEING SUED FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT BY HIS ORIGINAL CLUB
The success or failure of a professional athletic team may de-
pend upon one or two highly skilled players known in the trade
as superstars. The impact that the addition of a single player can
have on the fortunes of a team has not gone unnoticed by general
managers of teams involved in bidding wars. One of the funda-
mental aspects of such bidding wars is that not only will the
leagues try to outbid each other for the services of a college athlete
embarking on his first professional season, but teams in one league
will try to induce star players in the other league to join them.
The typical method of inducement, of course, is to offer the player
5. E.g., Mackey v. NFL, Civil No. 4-72-277 (D. Minn., filed May 13,
1972).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) [hereinafter referred to as the Sherman Act].
7. S. Rep. No. 92-1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
8. Id. at 3.
9. WHA Uniform Player's Contract (1972).
10. See § V infra.
11. Mackey v. NFL, Civil No. 4-72-277 (D. Minn., filed May 13,
1972).
substantially more money than he is receiving with his present
team.
A player is usually eager to accept such an offer, but before
he can do so he must extricate himself from contractual obliga-
tions to his present club. This is usually done by playing out the
option which the club has as part of the contract. 12 There are
great risks and expenses involved in playing out an option,18 how-
ever, so players will often simply sign a contract with the new
team without playing out their options. This will result in the
player having two contracts for the same season and often precipi-
tates suit by the original club against the player for breach of con-
tract. This section of the Comment will discuss the various de-
fenses which the player might raise to such a suit.
A. An Attack upon the Validity of the Reserve or Option Clause
Recognizing that very few players attempt to switch leagues
in the middle of a playing season, preferring instead to make the
switch between seasons, a seemingly valid defense by a player to a
suit for breach of contract would be that he is bound by no contract
because he has played the season for which he has actually signed
and thus is free to join another team. However, this defense is
undercut by a clause contained in the standard player contract used
by all professional athletic leagues, with the exception of the WHA.
This clause is known variously as an option or reserve 14 clause and
12. The basic idea of an option clause is that the club can automatic-
ally renew the player's contract by offering the player a stated percentage
of his salary for the past season. Normally, however, at contract negotia-
tions, the club will offer the player a raise which he can accept only by
signing a new contract for a year with an option to extend for another
year. If the player refuses to accept this, he can continue playing under
the option clause provisions and will become a free agent at the end of
the season. See Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.
1972).
13. Because the option clause allows the club to renew the player's
contract for another year at a stated percentage of his salary for last sea-
son, the cost of playing out the option is often regarded as merely the
decrease from the full salary to the percentage of the salary paid to a
player under the option clause. It is suggested, however, that this
method of calculation assumes the propriety of the option clause whereas
the real cost to the player should be measured by the difference between
the decreased salary he must take bcause of the option clause and the
salary he could make if the option clause had not been forced on him by
league rules requiring its inclusion in the standard form contract. Addi-
tionally these sums only cover the cost of one year. If the player suffers
a chareer-ending injury while playing out his option, the cost will be-
come far higher if the player had been offered a long term contract with
another team. If the two leagues merge in the year in which the player
is playing out his option, the player will find that he no longer has an
opportunity to take the best of two offers and may lose all opportunity
for tremendous increase in salary.
14. A true reserve clause binds the player to a club until he either
retires or is traded by that club. This is accomplished by allowing the
club, by the reserve clause, to renew the player's contract automatically
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gives the club the right to automatically renew a player's contract
for another season by offering him a stated percentage of his cur-
rent salary.15 An example of the option clause is found in para-
graph 10 of the NFL Standard Player Contract:
On or before the date of expiration of this contract, the
Club may, upon notice in writing to the Player, renew this
contract for a further term until the first day of May fol-
lowing said expiration on the same terms as are provided
by this contract, except that (1) the Club may fix the rate
of compensation to be paid by the Club to the Player dur-
ing said period of renewal, which compensation shall not
be less than ninety percent (90%) of the amount paid by
the Club to the Player during the preceding season, and
(2) after such renewal this contract shall not include a
further option to the Club to renew the contract .... 16
The validity of this provision has been upheld in the only case
directly challenging football's option clause, Dallas Cowboys Foot-
ball Club v. Harris.1 7 Harris' arguments that the clause was so
harsh and unconscionable as to be unenforceable at equity and that
it constituted a violation of the antitrust laws s were rejected. In-
stead, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the option clause
should be enforced. The court also upheld a provision tolling the
running of the option at any time in which the player announced
himself as retired. 9 The wisdom of this decision is questionable
because it takes awai a player's power to sit out the option season
each year and thus the player is always under contract and never free to
sign with another club. Such a perpetual service contract would clearly
restrict the player's ability to sell his services on the market and thus
would violate the Sherman Act. Because baseball is the only sport en-
joying immunity from the antitrust laws, baseball is the only sport in
which the true reserve clause is found. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). All other professional sports are limited to the use of an option
clause allowing renewal for only one year.
15. The option clause in the NHL declares that the amount of salary
to be paid the player may be determined by arbitration. NHL Standard
Player's Contract § 10 (1972).
16. NFL Standard Player's Contract, § 10, as quoted in Dallas Cow-
boys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
The option clause used by the American Basketball Association is essen-
tially the same, allowing the club to renew by offering 90% of the last
season's salary and specifically stating that the renewed contract will not
contain a further option to renew. ABA Uniform Player Contract, § 15
(1971).
17. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). There has been one other
case interpreting the option clause in football but the player involved was
not challenging the clause. Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d
308 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37, 47
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
19. Id. at 46.
and then join any other team which he chooses. The court in up-
holding this clause gave Harris the choice of either playing another
season with his original club or never playing again. This seems to
conflict both with the established policy of our courts against forc-
ing one to perform personal services against his will and with sev-
eral subsequent decisions which have held that the reasonableness
of an option clause lies in the fact that the player retains the right
not to play for his option season.
20
The so-called reserve clause is exemplified by paragraph 22 of
the NBA Uniform Player Contract:
(a) On or before September 1st (or, if a Sunday, then the
next preceding business day) next following the last play-
ing season covered by this contract, the Club may tender
to the Player a contract for the term of that season by
mailing the same to the Player at his address following
his signature hereto, or if none be given, then at his last
address of record with the Club. If prior to November 1
next succeeding said September 1, the player and the Club
have not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on
or before 10 days after said November 1, the Club shall
have the right by written notice to the Player at said ad-
dress to renew this contract for the period of one year on
the same terms, except that the amount payable to the
Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice;
provided, however, that said amount shall be an amount
payable at not less than 75o of the rate stipulated for the
preceding year.
2'
The distinguishing feature of the above clause from the option
clause is that no mention is made of whether the contract as re-
newed by the club shall contain a further option to renew. There
are two possible interpretations: (1) that the contract is merely
extended for one year and then is terminated as would be the case
under football's option clause; or (2) that the new contract also
contains an option clause and thus is a self-perpetuating reserve
clause similar to that used in baseball. When the Syracuse Na-
tionals sued Dick Barnett to prevent his jumping to the Cleveland
club of the American Basketball League,22 Barnett noted the am-
biguity of the clause. Barnett claimed that under the second inter-
pretation the contract would provide for perpetual service and thus
would be void. Further, as the contract had been written by the
club, Barnett urged that the interpretation most unfavorable to it
should be adopted, and therefore the reserve clause was illegal.
20. Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972);
Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.
1969); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct.
App. 1969).
21. NBA Uniform Player Contract, § 22, as quoted in Central N.Y.
Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 49, 181 N.E.2d 501, 509
(C.P. 1961).
22. Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 181
N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1961).
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The court rejected this argument on the policy that, where a con-
tract is capable of two meanings one of which would render it valid
and the other of which would render it invalid, the court should
interpret the contract so as to uphold its validity. 23 This reason-
ing was adopted by the court in Lemat Corp. v. Barry.24 Although
it seems to condone intentionally ambiguous draftsmanship on the
part of the NBA, it would seem to be the proper interpretation of
the clause under the Restatement view.
25
Thus, while the option clause used by football and the reserve
clause used by basketball are worded differently there has come to
be no difference in the way they are interpreted by the courts.
Both have come to be called option clauses by the courts and have
been interpreted as giving the club the power to prevent a player
from playing for anyone else for one year beyond the termination
of the original contract.
It would seem that the best attack on the option clause would
lie in alleging that it violates the Sherman Act because of its tend-
ency to freeze the labor pool within each league.26  However,
courts have been reluctant to allow violation of the Sherman Act
as a defense to a suit for breach of contract2: 27 "the federal courts
should not be quick to create a policy of non-enforcement beyond
that which is clearly the requirement of the Sherman Act. '28 The
reluctance of the courts in this area is reflected in the fact that
even those courts which have agreed that the reserve clause is of
doubtful validity have nonetheless interpreted it as effectively re-
newing the player's obligations to the club.29
B. Why Injunctive Enforcement Should be Denied
The player attempting to defend a suit for breach of contract
must realize that an attack on the reserve or option clause of his
23. Id. at 509-510.
24. 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969).
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236 (1932).
26. The purpose of the option clause is to prevent players from
changing clubs each year. The result, however, is that very few players
change teams without being traded. The type of labor market, where
employees cannot readily switch employers has been described as a labor
freeze and practices leading to such a freeze have been held in violation
of the Sherman Act. Nichols v. Spencer Int. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332
(7th Cir. 1967); Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957);
see § VA, infra.
27. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959). See generally Annot. 3
L. Ed. 2d 1798 (1959).
28. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1957).
29. Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C.
1969).
contract with the original club will probably not be successful. He
should, therefore, argue alternatively that even if the contract has
been renewed by its own terms, there are other reasons why it
should not be enforced. The original club cannot gain an injunc-
tion ordering the player to play for it, because of the basic policy
of the law against specific enforcement of personal service con-
tracts.30 There are several reasons for this policy. First, such an
order would result in involuntary servitude which would be re-
pugnant to our society.31 Furthermore, any decree ordering a per-
son to play ball for a club would be impossible to enforce 32 and
equity will generally refuse to grant an injunction that is unen-
forceable or would require continuous supervision.33 Finally, courts
are unwilling to grant an injunction which would force the player
and the club into a continuing personal relationship which may be
undesirable under strained circumstances.
3 4
The clubs, however, are cognizant that they cannot gain an in-
junction forcing the athlete to play and have included in all stand-
ard form professional athletic contracts two clauses which are de-
signed to give the club the power to indirectly achieve this result
by putting the player in the position where he either plays for the
club holding his contract or does not play at all. The first of these
clauses is known as a negative covenant and consists of a promise
by the player that he will not perform for any other team during
the term of the contract: "The Player promises and agrees ...
(c) to give his best services, as well as his loyalty, to the Club, and
to play basketball only for the Club unless released, sold or ex-
changed by the Club .... 35
Negative covenants have been construed in the landmark case
of Lumley v. Wagner' 6 as entitling the person to whom the nega-
30. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932).
31. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894).
32. For example, if a basketball player were averaging thirty points
per game before breaching his contract and after such an injunction or-
dering him to play, the same player was averaging only twenty points per
game, the club might argue that the player was not obeying the injunc-
tion while the player could argue that he was in an honest slump. This
would put the court in the position of judging a performer's work under
coercion by standards he achieved when his concentration was unboth-
ered by court orders. In a somewhat analagous case involving a singer,
it was held that no performer's work should be so judged. DeRivafolini
v. Corsett, 4 Paige Ch. 264 (N.Y. 1833).
33. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. 339 (1870).
34. Poultry Producers v. Bartow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 P. 93 (1922);
CoRmN oN CONTRACTS § 1204, at 401 (1964).
35. NBA Uniform Player Contract, § 5, as quoted in Central N.Y.
Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 42, 181 N.E.2d 506, 508
(C.P. 1961). The negative covenants contained in the standard contracts
used by the other sports all consist basically of this same promise by the
player not to perform for anyone else during the term of his contract.
NFL Standard Player Contract, § 5 (1972); WHA Uniform Player's Con-
tract, § 2 (172); NHL Standard Player's Contract, § 2 (1971).
36. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. App. 1852).
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tive covenant was made to an injunction restraining the performer
from appearing for anyone else. Modern authorities have gener-
ally adopted this principle with the provision that the promisee
must also show that the promisor was possessed of such unique
skill that he cannot be readily replaced, and therefore damages
caused by his breach are unascertainable.3Y In order to bring the
player's contract within these narrow bounds, the clubs have in-
serted a second clause in which the player asserts that he is the
type of performer for whom injunctive relief to the club would be
most appropriate:
9. The Player represents and agrees that he has excep-
tional and unique skill as a basketball player; that his
services to be rendered hereunder are of a special, un-
usual and extraordinary character which gives them pe-
culiar value which cannot be reasonably or adequately
compensated for in damages at law, and that the Player's
breach of this contract will cause the Club great and ir-
reparable injury and damage. The Player agrees that, in
addition to other remedies, the Club shall be entitled to
injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent a breach
of this contract by the Player, including, among others, the
right to enjoin the Player from playing basketball for any
other person or organization during the term of this con-
tract.3
8
A preliminary injunction will be granted to restrain the player
from playing elsewhere pending hearing of the original club's suit
for breach of contract 9 and this injunction will be extended for
the length of the contract, including the option year, with the orig-
inal club if the original club wins its suit for breach of contract.40
Any defense which the player might raise to a suit by his original
club for injunctive relief for breach of contract, then, must consist
basically of a showing why these two clauses should not be en-
forced.
One such defense would be to assert that the reasons given in
37. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380 (1932).
38. NBA Uniform Player Contract, § 9 (1970). The unique skill
clauses used by the NFL and the NHL are substantially the same. NFL
Standard Player Contract, § 8 (1972); NHL Standard Player's Contract,
§ 6 (1971). The unique skill clause used in the World Hockey Associa-
tion is basically the same but contains an additional agreement by the
player to waive any right to trial by jury and also to waive any counter-
claim or set-off. WHA Uniform Player's Contract, § 6 (1972).
39. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472
(9th Cir. 1969).
40. Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C.
1969); Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961).
the clause necessitating injunctive relief simply do not exist. In
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., v. Harris,41 the club challenged
the ability of a player to raise such a defense, arguing that estoppel
should prevent the player from denying the unique skill he as-
serted at contract formation. The court rejected this argument,
however, on the grounds that the assertion by the player that he is
possessed of unique skill is merely a statement of opinion which
he is free to show was erroneous.
4 2
The key obstacle to the player in raising this defense lies in
the landmark holding that the club need not show that the player
would be impossible to replace but merely that the value of the
player was incapable of precise determination and that, therefore,
he would be difficult to replace. 43 Modern cases have expanded
upon this early holding to the point that the phrase "unique skill"
has become almost meaningless. Dick Barnett was not on the all-
NBA team4 4 nor did he play in the East-West All-Star Game45
the year before he attempted to jump to Cleveland of the American
Basketball League from Syracuse. Nonetheless the court held that
he was of sufficient skill and ability to warrant the granting of an
injunction to restrain his playing for anyone but Syracuse: "[I] t
would seem that mere engagement as a basketball player in the
N.B.A., or A.B.L., carries with it recognition of his excellence and
extraordinary abilities. '46 This reasoning seems circular at best
4 7
and destroys the narrowly defined boundaries within which spe-
cific enforcement of negative covenants has usually been granted.48
Nonetheless, other courts have held that the mere signing of a con-
tract to play professional sports is evidence of unique skill.
4 9
The better view of the question of unique skill is expressed by
those cases holding that the issue must be resolved only after an
41. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
42. Id. at 43. This view of the unique skill clause as merely a state-
ment of opinion is further supported by the fact that all standard con-
tracts containing a unique skill clause also contain a provision allowing
the club to terminate the contract if the player should, in the opinion of
the club, fail to have sufficient skill; see, e.g., NFL Standard Player
Contract, § 6 (1972).
43. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
44. The All-NBA team is a mythical team selected each year by
the United States Basketball Writers as representing the best players in
the NBA.
45. A game held each year between the best players from each divi-
sion in the league. The game referred to was played on January 17, 1961.
46. Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 55,
181 N.E.2d 506, 514 (C.P. 1961).
47. The reasoning is circular in that the purpose of the court's in-
quiry into the amount of skill possessed by the player is to determine
whether the player is sufficiently skilled to warrant an injunction au-
thorized by the contract and the courts take the signing of that contract as
proof that the player is sufficiently skilled to warrant the injunction.
48. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380(2) (1932).
49. E.g., Washington Capitols Basketball Club v. Barry, 304 F. Supp.
1193 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
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examination of all factors involved. Thus, in Winnipeg Rugby
Football Club v. Freeman,50 the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio noted that the level of competition varied greatly
from the National Collegiate Athletic Association to the Canadian
Football League to the NFL. Accordingly, the court reasoned that
Freeman's denial of unique skill must be considered in light of the
skill level of the Canadian Football League of which Winnipeg was
a member. Even though Freeman may have been just another
player in the NFL, the court held that he did possess unique ability
for a player of the Canadian Football League and thus would be
restrained from playing outside of it.51 Following this reasoning
it would seem that a player who is not of all-star caliber in a well
established league would not be restrained from jumping to a new
league where the caliber of play is lower and the same player
would, perhaps, be an all-star.52
Another factor which must be considered in determining
whether or not the player is possessed of sufficiently unique skill
to warrant the issuance of a restraining order is the degree to
which the success of the club has come to depend on that player's
functioning as a member of that team. Thus, in Long Island Ameri-
can Association Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt,5 3 the fact that the
defendant did not attempt to jump leagues until the training camp
was over carried great weight in the court's decision to grant the
restraining order:
Once the team is organized and the football season begins,
it may be extremely difficult to find adequate replacements
for players about whom plays have been planned. This is
so by reason of the brevity of the season (three months)
and also by reason of the fact that after the start of the
season, most of the desirable players have already been
hired by other clubs.
54
In line with this reasoning, a player who jumps leagues between
seasons might argue that the club has plenty of notice that he will
50. 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955). Upon graduation from college,
Freeman and Jack Locklear had signed to play with the Winnipeg team
of -the Canadian Football League. Each then changed his mind and
signed with the Cleveland Browns of the NFL. The case reported is the
suit by the Winnipeg team to prevent the two from playing for anyone
but Winnipeg.
51. Id. at 367.
52. For a comparison of the quality in the NHL and the WHA which
suggests that an average player in the former may be a star in the latter,
see SPoais ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 9, 1972, at 73.
.53. 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
54. Id. at 860.
have to be replaced. If there were some other player on the same
club who could perform as well,55 it would seem that the club in
reality will suffer no damage that warrants injunctive relief. Oc-
casionally a team may be able to pick up an established player
of equal ability who has been waived by another team.56 If this
is the case, then, the only possible damage would be any greater
salary that the newly acquired player would have to be paid. Al-
though such damage might give rise to a suit for damages against
the breaching player it would seem that the club would be pre-
cluded from obtaining injunctive relief.
In most cases, however, the type of player who becomes a de-
fendant in a suit arising during a bidding war is neither the type
who is merely an average ball player compared to the other ath-
letes in his original league, nor is he the type who can readily be
replaced by another member of his original team or by a player on
waivers. The type of player involved in league jumping is an es-
tablished star in his league and a key figure on his team. Thus,
even under the better view of determining unique skill only after
careful consideration of all factors involved, it seems unlikely that
a player of the caliber of Rick Barry would be able to persuade
a court that he was of so little skill as to warrant the denial of an
order restraining him from jumping leagues.
The so-called unique skill clause also states, as a reason for
injunctive relief in the event of breach of contract by the player,
that damages caused by the breach are incapable of determination.
The argument that damages are determinable has little or no
chance of success, however, due to the nature of damage caused by
the player's breach. The usual consequence of a team's loss of its
star player is a decline both in league standings and in attendance,
but there is no guarantee that this will happen and if it does there
is no exact dollar amount which may be said to have been caused
by the player's breach. Even liberal courts which allow an esti-
55. The usual damages though to flow from the loss of a star are a
decline both in attendance and in league standings. It should be remem-
bered, however, that any breach on the player's part is not in leaving the
team but merely in leaving the team one year earlier than he would by
playing out his option. It is suggested, therefore, that if the team per-
formed as well that year without his services as they would have had the
player played out his option, the club has not only not suffered damages
but has benefited by not having to pay that player's salary. An example
of how a team has been able to carry on successfully with a substitute is
found in the Baltimore Colts who won the NFL Championship in 1969
with Earl Morrall, a much travelled veteran quarterback, replacing John
Unitas for the entire season.
56. For example, in 1962, the San Diego Chargers placed quarter-
back Jack Kemp on waivers and he was claimed by the Buffalo Bills.
Kemp went on to lead the Bills to two league championships. For an
illustration as to how waivers are used in a sport, see N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1971, § V, at 2.
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mate of the dollar loss occasioned by a player's breach refuse to al-
low a recovery of this amount.'
7
Thus, unless the player is a marginal ball player, he will not
be able to prevent the granting of a restraining order merely by
showing that the reasons given as necessitating it in the contract
are invalid. However, the granting or refusal of such a restraining
order is discretionary with the court 58 and the player may attempt
to show why, in spite of the language of the contract, the remedy
is inappropriate. Most athletic contracts may be terminated by the
club at any time the club feels the player is not playing up to the
skill level required for the sport, but are binding upon the player
for a minimum of one year with an option to the club to renew
for another year. Lack of mutuality5 9 would seem to be a valid
reason for denying the equitable relief of specific enforcement of
the negative covenants contained in the contract. In Connecticut
Professional Sports Corporation v. Heyman,60 lack of mutuality
was held to be a valid reason for denying an injunction to prevent
Heyman from playing in the ABA while his contract with the Hart-
ford Capitols of the Eastern Professional Basketball League was
still in its option season.
The primary reason for denying relief is the fact that plain-
tiff seeks to enforce a contract that purports to bind de-
fendant for a one year period and at the same time permit
plaintiff'to terminate at will. While this Court does not
adhere to a wooden mutuality rule, the existence of a pro-
vision entitling plaintiff to end the contract whenever it
chooses is an important factor in determining whether in-
junctive relief is appropriate.61
Most courts have rejected the defense of lack of mutuality, how-
ever, following the reasoning in Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie.0
2
57. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240
(Ct. App. 1969).
58. Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C.
1969); Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961).
59. See, e.g., NFL Standard Player Contract § 6 (1972). Lack of
mutuality is used here both as it refers to mutuality of remedy in that
the club can get specific enforcement of the player's negative covenant
but the player cannot get specific enforcement of the club's promises be-
cause of the club's power to terminate, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 377
(1932), and as it refers to mutuality of obligation in that the player is
bound for a minimum of one year, with an option to the club for another
year, whereas the club can terminate its obligation at any time.
60. 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
61. Id. at 621.
62. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
Napoleon Lajoie had signed a contract on April 18, 1900 to play
baseball with the Philadelphia Ball Club, granting the club the op-
tion to renew for two years and allowing the club to terminate by
giving him ten days written notice, paying the salary then due,
and paying his expenses home. When Lajoie signed a conflicting
contract with the Philadelphia American League Baseball Club,
the Philadelphia Ball Club brought suit to enforce the negative
covenant contained in Lajoie's contract. The Philadelphia Com-
mon Pleas Court refused to grant an injunction on the grounds that
the contract was lacking in mutuality and, therefore, could not be
enforced in equity.63 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania reversed, ordering Lajoie not to play for anyone other than
the Philadelphia Ball Club.
6 4
The court first noted that the right to seek injunctive relief
had been specifically granted to the club in Lajoie's contract, and
that Lajoie had partially performed under that contract. From
these two facts the court suggested that the ball club had acquired
an equitable right in complete performance which might even be
enforced without regard to mutuality.
The relation between the parties has been so far changed,
as to give the plaintiff an equity arising out of the part
performance, to insist upon the completion of the agree-
ment according to its terms by the defendant. This equity
may be distinguished from the original right under the
contract itself, and it might well be questioned whether
the court would not be justified in giving effect to it
by injunction without regard to the mutuality or nonmu-
tuality in the original contract.6 5
The court did not, however, rule that there was no requirement of
mutuality in order for specific enforcement of the negative cove-
nant to be granted. Instead the court declared that there was no
lack of mutuality in the contract and therefore specifically en-
forced the negative covenant.
We are not persuaded that the terms of this contract
manifest any lack of mutuality in remedy. Each party has
the possibility of enforcing all rights stipulated for in the
agreement. It is true that the terms make it possible for
the plaintiff to put an end to the contract in a space of
time much less than the period during which defendant
has agreed to supply his services; but mere difference in
the rights stipulated for does not destroy mutuality of
remedy. Freedom of contract covers a wide range of ob-
ligation and duty as between the parties, and it may not
be impaired, as long as the bounds of reasonableness and
fairness are not transgressed.66
63. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. 309 (Phila. C.P.
1901), 7'ev'd, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
64. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
65. Id. at 218-19, 51 A. at 974.
66. Id. at 219, 51 A. at 975.
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Although the Lajoie case's rejection of lack of mutuality as a
defense to injunctive relief has been widely followed, the reasons
why courts reject lack of mutuality as a defense have varied
greatly. Some courts are merely following local law that there is
no need for mutuality of remedy for specific enforcement. 67 This
is the position taken by the Restatement of Contracts, "The fact
that the remedy of specific enforcement is not available to one
party is not a sufficient reason for refusing it to the other party."68
In Central New York Basketball Inc. v. Barnett "' the court cited the
Lajoie case as authority for the proposition that the lack of mu-
tuality of remedy will not prevent an injunction after the contract
has been partly performed.70 This would seem to be an adoption
by the Barnett court of a position which was merely a dictum in
the Lajoie case.71 That after partial performance by the athlete
the club acquires an equitable interest in a complete performance,
enforceable without regard to mutuality of remedy, is to be criti-
cized because it penalizes an athlete for partial performance by
taking away the defense of lack of mutuality which he would have
had if he had not performed at all.
An additional reason for rejecting lack of mutuality as a de-
fense is put forth by those courts holding that the player cannot
now object to clauses in the contract which give the club the right
to injunctive relief because they were granted for adequate con-
sideration. 72 Although this best reflects the holding of the Lajoie
case, it is suggested that courts which uphold negative covenant
and unique skill clauses on the grounds that they were freely bar-
gained for completely disregard the true nature of contract forma-
tion between the ball player and the club. The ball player does
not pick and choose which clauses of a contract he will accept in
return for a certain amount of compensation for each clause.
Rather, the ball player is handed a standard form contract which
cannot be altered in any material way, 73 and which contains these
67. E.g., Long Island American Ass'n. Football Club v. Manrodt, 23
N.Y.S. 858 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
68. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 372(1) (1932).
69. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1961).
70. Id. at 49, 181 N.E.2d at 515.
71. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
72. E.g., Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 679, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 240, 243 (1969).
73. League rules usually require that all player contracts be on the
standard form provided by the league. Any changes from this form must
be approved by the commissioner. See, e.g., NFL Constitution and By-
Laws, Art. V, § 15.1 (1972). The fact that even a player of proven talent,
who should have great bargaining power, cannot simply write his own
contract by picking and choosing which clauses to include in his agree-
clauses giving the club the extraordinary power of preventing him
from playing for anyone else by means of injunctive relief. The
player then is faced simply with the choice of accepting the con-
tract as it is or not playing. The fact that he can go to another
league, if in fact there is another league, is of scant help because
all leagues use standard form contracts containing basically the
same provisions. Thus, the courts, by refusing to allow lack of mu-
tuality as a defense are not enforcing a contract which was freely
entered into by the player and the club, but are enforcing the
power of the owners to dictate terms to the players.
7 4
III. DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO A PLAYER WHO HAS CHANGED
His MIND ABOUT JUMPING LEAGUES AND IS BEING
SUED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The instability of teams in a newly established league is a
standard facet of bidding wars. Thus a player on a team in a well
established league may eagerly sign with a team in the newer
league for a greatly increased salary only to find that there is every
prospect that the team or league will fold before he is paid or that
the city in which he believed he would be playing no longer has a
franchise in that league and his contract is to be performed in an
entirely different location. A consideration of these factors will
often cause the player to change his mind about jumping to the
new league and sign a new contract with his original team.7 5 The
team of the newer league, however, may not be willing to let the
player change his mind and may sue to enforce the player's con-
tract with it. This section will examine the rights and liabilities
of the player involved in such a suit.
A. A Bargain Involving Breach of Existing Contract is Void
It is a principle of contract law that "a bargain, the making or
ment with a club is illustrated by the case of Joe Kapp. In the 1969-70
season, Kapp led the Minnesota Vikings to the NFL championship before
the team was upset by the Kansas City Chiefs in the Super Bowl. Un-
happy with the Vikings, Kapp was traded to the Boston Patriots before
the 1970-71 season. Kapp reached agreement with the club for $500,000
for 3 years. In July, 1971 it was discovered that Kapp's agreement with
the Patriots had not been on the standard form of the league. The club
was informed by the commissioner, Pete Rozelle, that Kapp would not be
able to play until he signed such an agreement. On advice of his attorney,
Kapp refused to sign such a standard form contract and has not been
allowed to play in the NFL since this refusal. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1971,
at 15, col. 2.
74. For this reason it is suggested that courts should take a new
approach and treat athletic contracts as adhesion contracts. See § VI, in-
fra.
75. An additional consideration which may be motivating the player
is an offer from his original team which is greater than that of the new
team but which comes after the player has signed the contract with the
new team. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham,
457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
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performance of which involves a breach of contract with a third
person is illegal." 6 Thus, if the player can show that his contract
with the second team involved a breach of his contract with his
original team he may be successful in preventing that second team
from enforcing its contract. The comments to the Restatement in-
dicate, however, that a contract will only be declared illegal if its
performance not only involves the breach of another contract but
also requires for its performance the breach of that other contract.
77
Therefore, to a large degree the ability of a player to successfully
raise this defense will depend upon the wording of the contract
with the second team.
If the contract calls for immediate performance when the player
has remaining contractual obligations to his present club it would
be illegal under the Restatement yiew.78 Usually, however, con-
tracts between clubs and players currently under contract to a dif-
ferent club are so worded that performance is to begin only after
the player has freed himself from his contractual obligations to his
present club.70 In Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v.
Barry,80 the Ninth Circuit Court noted that Barry's contract with
the San Francisco Warriors terminated September 30, 1968, even
including the option season, whereas his contract with the Oakland
Oaks8 ' was to begin "October 2, 1968 or such earlier date as [Bar-
ry's] services as a basketball player are not enjoined. '8 2 The court
construed this language as an indication of an awareness on Oak-
land's part of Barry's contractual obligations to the San Francisco
Warriors and an expression of Oakland's intention to create a con-
tract which would not be illegal as calling for a breach of Barry's
contract with the Warriors: "Parties to a contract are deemed to
have intended a lawful rather than an unlawful act."8' The con-
76. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 576 (1932).
77. Id. at 1081, comment a.
78. Id. at 1081, comment a, illustration 1: "A bargains with B for
B's employment at a stated salary for a term beginning immediately. B
at the time is under a contract of employment to C which has not termi-
nated. The bargain between A and B is illegal."
79. See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
80. 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969).
81. The Oakland Oaks franchise was sold to the Washington Capitols.
Barry's contract was specifically mentioned as one of the assets sold by
the Oaks to the Capitols and thus Washington, as assignee of Oakland,
brought suit when Barry breached the contract by signing a conflicting
contract to play with his original team, the San Francisco Warriors.
Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.
1969).
82. Id. at 477.
83. Id. at 478. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236 (1932).
struction given to this clause was that Barry's obligation to Oak-
land would begin only after his contractual obligations to San
Francisco had ended. Thus interpreted there was nothing illegal
about the contract itself nor was it entered into by means them-
selves unlawful.84
In Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham,5 the Fourth Circuit Court
adopted the holding of the Barry court that a contract to begin
only after the expiration of the player's contractual obligation to
his present club terminates is not void for illegality:
In agreement with Washington Capitols Basketball Club,
Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969), we think that
there was neither illegality nor unclean hands in the Cou-
gars' contracting for Cunningham's services to be ren-
dered after the term of his contract with the 76ers had
expired, notwithstanding that the negotiations, whether
directly or through intermediaries, took place while Cun-
ningham's contract with the 76ers was still in full force
and effect. . . . Cunningham was under no obligation, op-
tion or restraint with respect to the 76ers after October 1,
1971, and the Cougars had a lawful right to bid and con-
tract for his services to be rendered after that date.8 6
The Cougars had also given Cunningham a promissory note for
$80,000. The exact amount to be paid depended upon whether or
not Cunningham sat out his option year with the 76ers, in which
case the face value of the note was to be paid, or played out the
option season, in which case the note was payable to the extent
that Cunningham's salary with the 76ers for the option season was
less than $100,000.87 Cunningham contended that the inclusion of
this note was an illegal inducement to him to sit out the option
season and, therefore, his contract with the Cougars was illegal.
The court rejected this contention:
Of course the note was payable in full if Cunningham "sat
out" his option year with the 76ers but Cunningham al-
ready had this right since he could not be required to ren-
der personal services against his will. The incentive the
note provided-to a maximum of $20,000.00 over the amount
payable if he did not play-substantially diminished the
likelihood that he would exercise this right.
88
Even if the note had stated that it would be payable only if Cun-
ningham sat out the option year it seems unlikely that the contract
with the Cougars would have been illegal as involving the breach
of another contract. 9 The renewal of the option clause has been
84. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d
472 (9th Cir. 1972).
85. 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
86. Id. at 724.
87. Id. at 722.
88. Id. at 724.
89. It may have constituted a tortious interference with prospective
advantage, however. See PROSSER ON TORTS § 123 (3d Ed. 1971).
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interpreted as not obligating the player to play for the team for
another year but as merely obligating the player not to play for
anyone else during the year. 0 Under this view, even a contract
requiring the player to sit out his option year would not be one
requiring a breach and thus would not be illegal.91
It would seem, then, that a defense based on illegality of the
player's contract with a new club as involving the breach of the
player's contract with his present club will be successful only where
the contract with the new club clearly requires immediate per-
formance in breach of the contract with the player's present club.
It is unlikely in today's sports world, where legal decisions are fol-
lowed as closely as the pennant races, that such a contract would
be written and therefore, the defense seems to be of little real
value to the player.
B. Unclean Hands
As previously noted the only way in which a club can effec-
tively enforce a contract with a player is by suing for specific per-
formance of the negative covenant which the player has made.
92
This suit, being in equity, will allow the player to raise equitable
defenses. 93 As an alternative to the possible legal defenses the
player can present to prevent his contract with the new team from
being declared legal, the player may present reasons why the plain-
tiff club is not entitled to equitable relief.
Perhaps the cardinal maxim governing the availability of equi-
table relief is "He who comes into equity must come with clean
hands."
94
This maxim is far more than a mere banality. It is a self-
imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity
to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative
to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper
may have been the behavior of the defendant. That doc-
trine is rooted in the historical concept of a court of equity
as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of
conscience and good faith. This presupposes a refusal on
90. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472,
477 (9th Cir. 1969); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671 (Ct. App.
1969).
91. This would not be so in football where a player cannot terminate
his contract with the club by merely sitting out a season. See § HA
supra.
92. See § IIB supra.
93. See Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.
N.C. 1969).
94. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 397-404 (5th ed. 1941).
its part to be "the abetter of inequity" (citations omit-
ted) .9
The view of unclean hands as primarily for the protection of the
court allows a defendant to raise this defense even though he him-
self has been guilty of inequitable conduct.96 A player who has
signed a contract with a new team while still under contract to his
original club and then changed his mind may raise the defense of
unclean hands against the new club's suit for specific enforcement
of his negative covenants even though he himself has breached
both his contract with his original club and his contract with the
new club.
9 7
That the player's inequitable conduct will not prevent him
from raising the defense of unclean hands on the part of the plain-
tiff club is of little use unless the player is also successful in show-
ing that the plaintiff club has acted in so inequitable a fashion as
to render its hands unclean. Whether inducing a player to jump
leagues, where such jump would not involve a breach of contract,
constitutes unclean hands has not yet been clearly answered. In
Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson,98 the court held that even
though the validity of the St. Louis Hawks' contractual hold over
Lou Hudson might be questionable, Hudson had at least a moral
obligation to continue playing for the Hawks and, therefore, Min-
nesota's conduct in inducing him to play for them must be consid-
ered inequitable.
Even if the reserve clause in the St. Louis contract was of
doubtful validity, the fact remains that the Muskies, know-
ing that Hudson was under a moral, if not a legal, obliga-
tion to St. Louis for the 1967-68 and subsequent seasons,
if St. Louis chose to exercise its option, sent for Hudson
and induced him to repudiate his obligation to St. Louis.
Such conduct, even if strictly within the law because of
the St. Louis contract being unenforceable, was so tainted
with unfairness and injustice as to justify a court of equity
in withholding relief.99
The concept that a player has a moral obligation to his present
team running beyond the term of his contract and that, therefore,
anyone who negotiates with him from another team has unclean
hands, is to be seriously criticized for the consequences that its ap-
95. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
96. See, e.g., Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979
(M.D.N.C. 1969); New York Football Giants, Inc. v; Los Angeles Charg-
ers Football Club, 291 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1961).
97. E.g., Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.
N.C. 1969). Lou Hudson was playing with the St. Louis Hawks of the
NBA when he signed a contract to play for the Minnesota Muskies of the
ABA. Hudson then reconsidered and signed a new contract for the same
period with the Hawks. The Muskies then brought suit to enforce their
contract.
98. 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
99. Id. at 990.
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plication would bring. Under this view a player could not even
sign a new contract until his present one had expired, including
all option seasons. Basketball contracts do not expire, however,
until October 1 and the basketball season begins a week later. It is
very doubtful that any basketball player would go to the expense
and risk of playing out his option with his present team on the
mere hope that he would be able to sign with a new team in a
week's time. Thus, the view taken by the Hudson court would re-
sult either in a complete freeze in the labor pool of basketball
players'0 0 or in all negotiations for the services of basketball play-
ers being carried on in utter secrecy, with no warning to the pres-
ent club until the option term is over and the new contract had
been signed. 01
It is submitted that the better view as to what conduct by the
new club will preclude it, under the clean hands doctrine, from
seeking equitable relief is that as long as the inducement is not
itself accompanied by unlawful means, there is nothing inequitable
about the signing of a player to a contract for services to begin
only after his contractual obligations to his present club expires.10 2
This view not only allows the strength of the contract to be deter-
mined on its own merits, but also increases the bargaining power
of players who are thus free to negotiate not only with their present
club but also with new clubs during their option seasons.
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
TURNING PROFESSIONAL
Two distinct problems are encountered by the college athlete 08
wishing to turn professional. If he is a senior or four years have
elapsed since he began college, he is considered fair game by the
professional leagues and intense pressure will be brought by each
league to sign the player first. Ordinarily teams will wait until the
athlete's college career is over and then select him in an orderly
100. See § VA, infra (freezing labor pool may violate Sherman Act).
101. Because far more players play out the option season as a bar-
gaining weapon than ever actually leave their team, it should not be
thought that merely playing out the option season is a clear warning to
the club that the player is leaving. See SpoRTs ILLusTRATED May 1, 1972,
at 29.
102. See, e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.
1972); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472
(9th Cir. 1969).
103. Because hockey players generally come up from the amateur sys-
tem in Canada, rather than from college teams, this section will generally
be limited to college basketball or football players turning professional.
draft.'0 4 As the competitive pressure increases in a bidding war,
however, teams may attempt to sign a player before his college
career is over. Often this has resulted in the athlete signing one
contract in secrecy with one league while still playing college ath-
letics' ° and then signing another for more money with the other
league after the season is over. This usually results in a suit by
the team holding the first contract. This section will discuss the
defenses to such a suit.
In contrast to the problem faced by senior athletes who may
have signed too many contracts, a star athlete who is not yet in his
fourth year of college may find that league rules10 6 make him in-
eligible to play professional basketball so that either no team will
hire him or, even if one team does sign him to a contract, the
league will refuse to allow that team to use him. This practice has
been declared to constitute a group boycott and therefore to be in
violation of the Sherman Act in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Man-
agement, Inc.107  In response to this holding some leagues have
modified their eligibility requirements somewhat while others'08
still maintain a strict requirement that four years have elapsed
since the athlete first entered college. This section will also discuss
the legality of these various eligibility rules.
A. Secret Signings
A college athlete loses his eligibility immediately upon signing
a contract to play professional sports.10 Nonetheless, in their ea-
gerness to sign a star college athlete before the other league has
had a chance to talk to him, representatives from professional teams
often begin talks secretly with that athlete before his college season
is over. The athlete may in fact be eager to sign, either out of de-
sire for a quick cash bonus or out of fear that leagues will merge
or come to an agreement concerning a joint draft before the college
season is over.' 10
104. For a general discussion of the theory behind the draft and how
it works, see § VB infra.
105. Under the eligibility rules of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, which numbers among its members the vast majority of
American colleges and universities, an athlete becomes ineligible to play
intercollegiate sports immediately upon signing a contract to play pro-
fessional sports. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Rules 12-13.
106. E.g., Constitution and By-Laws for the NFL, Art. XII (1972).
107. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
108. See § VB infra.
109. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
110. A bill has been reported out of committee in the Senate which
would allow the two basketball leagues to merge without violating the
antitrust laws. S. Rep. No. 92-1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). One ob-
vious effect of such a merger is to deprive the player of a chance to sell
his services to the highest bidder since under a merged league, there will
be only one club with whom the player can deal. The natural result of
a merger is to decrease significantly the prices which college athletes can
command by turning professional.
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The athlete also usually has a strong desire to finish his college
season, especially if his team is headed for the prestigious and ex-
citing post season tournaments and games held annually. In order
to prevent the athlete from being declared ineligible"' to play in
these contests, the club may agree to keep the professional contract
a secret. The athlete then finishes his college career and is drafted
by the other league. If he has done exceptionally well in a post sea-
son tournament, he may find that the second contract is for sub-
stantially more money. If the player signs this second contract he is
usually sued by the first team for breach of contract. This section
will examine the various defenses which the player can raise to that
suit.112
Because the contract signed secretly by the athlete is his initial
contract rather than a renewal through the option clause, certain
defenses may be available to him that would not be available to an
established player." '  For example the college athlete may claim
that he has never entered into a binding contract with the team
because he changed his mind before the contract was approved by
the commissioner of the league.' 4 This has been held to be a valid
defense both in the case of Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson" 5 and
in Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon.1 " Both cases in-
volved players on the 1959 Louisiana State University football
team who signed professional contracts before the Sugar Bowl in
which their school was to play the University of Mississippi. To
avoid being declared ineligible, each player asked the professional
team to keep the contract secret until after the game was over." 7
111. It is important to realize here that keeping the contract secret
does not allow the athlete to remain eligible. The athlete's eligibility was
lost by signing the contract and the secrecy is designed merely to prevent
this ineligibility from becoming known.
112. This section discusses only the legal and equitable defenses which
the player can raise in such a suit and does not undertake to judge the
ethics of such secret signings on the player's part. For an illustration of
how one court was able to uphold the legal rights of the player even
though thoroughly disgusted with the ethics of the transaction, see Detroit
Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960).
113. See § II supra.
114. Each professional league employs a chief executive officer
known as a commissioner with broad powers to regulate activity between
the players and the clubs. Among these powers of the commissioner are
approval or disapproval of contracts between players and clubs in the
league. For an illustration of the full scope of the powers of a commis-
sioner, see Constitution and By-Laws for the NFL, Art. VIII (1972).
115. 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960).
116. 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
117. Although it may appear from the discussion and from the fact
that both players went to Louisiana State University that these transac-
The contracts were then signed and bonus payments were tendered
to the players. Before the teams had submitted the players' con-
tracts to the commissioner, both Cannon and Robinson changed
their minds, returned the bonus payments, and signed contracts
with different teams. When sued by the clubs with whom they
had originally signed, each raised the defense that, until the com-
missioner approved the agreement, there was no binding contract
but merely an offer by the player which he was free to withdraw
before acceptance by the commissioner. This defense was based
on paragraph 13 of the NFL Standard Player Contract each player
had signed, which reads in part: "This agreement shall become
valid and binding upon each party only when, as and if it shall
be approved by the commissioner. 11 8  The teams, on the other
hand, argued that approval by the commissioner was a mere for-
mality and that the agreements were binding contracts immedi-
ately upon being signed by the player. Quoting the clause involved,
the Cannon court held that the interpretation offered by the player
was correct:
It is the opinion of this court that on this issue the defend-
ant must prevail. Approval of the Commissioner is essen-
tial to the formation of a contract here and this is so be-
cause the terms of the document make it so .... The
words "shall become valid" clearly compels the conclusion
that-in the absence of approval-it is not yet a valid
agreement.119
The Robinson case, decided nine days later, adopted the same
view of the commissioner's approval:
It is difficult to devise clearer language indicating that no
valid or binding contract existed until after the required
approval was secured. We must conclude, as have others,
interpreting the same clause, that all Robinson executed
was an offer which had not yet been unconditionally ac-
cepted by the Detroit Football Company when he with-
drew it on December 29.120
Perhaps in response to rulings which interpreted the commis-
sioner's approval as a condition precedent to the existence of a
binding contract, the wording of the clause has been changed in
professional athletic contracts. The disapproval of the commis-
sioner is now seen as a condition subsequent which will terminate
the contract.
tions were carried on at the same time and at the same place, this is not
in fact the case. Cannon signed with the Rams on November 30, 1959 in
Philadelphia and Robinson signed with the Detroit Lions on December 2,
1959 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
118. NFL Standard Player Contract, § 13, as quoted in Detroit Foot-
ball Company v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960).
119. Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717,
721 (S.D. Cal. 1960).




This contract shall be valid and binding upon the parties
hereto immediately upon its execution. A copy of such
contract shall be filed by the Club with the Commissioner
within ten (10) days after execution. The Commissioner
shall have the right to terminate this contract by his dis-
approval thereof in his office; such action by the Commis-
sioner shall be exercised in accordance with and pursuant
to the power vested in the Commissioner by the Constitu-
tion and By-Laws of the League; in such event, the Com-
missioner shall give both parties written notice of such
termination, and thereupon, both parties shall be relieved
of their respective rights and liabilities hereunder. 1
21
Under this clause, the player is not free to sign any other contracts
until disapproval by the commissioner of the initial contract. 2
2
A general principle of contract law is "A bargain the perform-
ance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving them
as to material facts, or by defrauding them, or without justification
by other means is illegal. 1 2' It is obvious that the agreement to
keep secret the fact that a star athlete playing college ball has been
signed to become professional will harm and defraud numerous
third parties. Once the ineligibility is discovered, the school will
forfeit all games in which the athlete played so that not only will
the schools be harmed with regard to their reputation but they may
also have to forfeit gate receipts of games already played and the
forfeits may lower their record to the point where the school will
no longer be eligible for certain post-season tournaments. Unless
the athlete can demonstrate that the agreement to keep the con-
tract secret was an integral part of the contract itself, and in fact
was part of the consideration for entering into that contract, it
seems likely that the agreement to keep the contract secret and
the contract to play ball for the professional club will be regarded
as separate agreements, and that only the agreement to keep the
121. NFL Standard Player Contract, § 17 (1972); accord, NBA Uni-
form Player Contract (1972); ABA Uniform Player Contract (1972).
122. Id. This statement is restricted to the question of whether the
player has such freedom within the terms of the contract itself and does
not prevent the player from asserting any defenses of illegality or un-
clean hands to show why the contract is unenforceable in spite of this
clause. One such defense, although it has never been raised, would be an
argument that the secret contract to play professionally violated the
player's scholarship agreement with the school (which would require
that the player be an eligible amateur athlete) and thus was illegal as
"a bargain the making or performance of which involves a breach of con-
tract with a third person." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 576 (1932). The
difficulty with this defense, of course, lies in the questionable classifica-
tion of a scholarship agreement as a contract.
123. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 577 (1932).
athlete's ineligibility secret will be declared illegal. Thus, in Hous-
ton Oilers, Inc. v. Neely,124 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected Neely's argument that his professional contract with Houston
should be declared illegal on grounds that it was kept secret, re-
ferring to the secrecy agreement as merely "an extrinsic oral un-
derstanding."12
5
Instead of attempting the difficult task of avoiding the con-
tract on grounds of illegality, perhaps the athlete's best defense
would be to assert that the professional club acted so inequitably
in keeping the contract secret that it is not entitled, under the clean
hands doctrine, to seek equitable enforcement of that contract.
This defense does not require that the acts of the plaintiff amount
to illegal acts, but only that they be "any willful act concerning
the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equi-
table standards of conduct. ... ,1"26 The fact that the interest of
the public is involved may be of great significance to the court in
its decision whether to bar the club on the grounds of unclean
hands.
Moreover when a suit in equity concerns the public inter-
est as well as the private interests of the litigants this doc-
trine assumes even wider and more significant proportions.
For if an equity court properly uses the maxim to with-
hold its assistance in such a case it not only prevents the
wrong doer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression
but averts an injury to the public.
1 2 7
In 1960 the Giants signed Charles Flowers to a contract to
play professional football while he was still playing college ball
at the University of Mississippi but agreed to keep the signing se-
cret so that Flowers could play in the Sugar Bowl. When Flowers
later signed another contract with the Los Angeles Chargers, the
agreement by the Giants to keep Flowers' contract secret was held
to be such inequitable conduct as to bar them, under the clean
hands maxim from obtaining injunctive relief:
Here the plaintiff's whole difficulty arises because it ad-
mittedly took from Flowers what it claims to be a binding
contract, but which it agreed with Flowers it would, in
effect, represent was not in existence in order to deceive
others who had a very material and important interest in
the subject matter. If there had been a straightforward
execution of the document, followed by its filing with the
Commissioner, none of the legal problems now presented
to this court to untangle would exist. We think no party
has the right thus to create problems by its devious and
deceitful conduct and then approach a court of equity
124. 362 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1966).
125. Id. at 40.
126. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
127. Id. at 816.
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with a plea that the pretended status which it has foisted
on the public be ignored and its rights declared as if it
had acted in good faith throughout.
When it became apparent from the uncontradicted
testimony of Mara that this deceit was practical in order
to bring into being the "contract" sued upon, the trial court
should have dismissed the suit without more on the basis
of the "clean hands" doctrine.
128
This interpretation has not been unanimous, however. When Ralph
Neely signed a contract with the Houston Oilers on December 1,
1964 the contract was kept secret so that he could play in the Gator
Bowl game on January 1, 1965. When Neely changed his mind and
signed with the Dallas Cowboys, the Houston Oilers brought suit
to enjoin violation of Neely's contract with them. Injunctive relief
was denied at the trial level on the grounds that Houston had acted
so inequitably as to be barred from equity under the clean hands
doctrine. On appeal the decision was reversed.
It is neither unlawful nor inequitable for college foot-
ball players to surrender their amateur status and turn
professional at any time. Neely was as free to bind himself
to such a contract on December 1, 1964 as he would have
been after January 2, 1965. Nor was Houston under any
legal duty to publicize the contract or to keep it secret. Its
agreement to keep secret that which it had a legal right
to keep secret cannot be considered inequitable or uncon-
scionable as those terms are ordinarily used in contract ne-
gotiations.
29
Neely had relied on the Giants case but the court attempted to
distinguish the two cases factually and then went on to specifically
disagree with it:
[I] f the rule announced in that case was intended to apply
to every instance in which a contract is entered into with
a college football player before a post-season game with
an understanding that it be kept secret to permit that
player to compete in the game, then we must respectfully
disagree with the conclusion. 1 0
It is respectfully suggested that the court in the Neely case has
not only misinterpreted the facts but has misjudged the applica-
tion of the unclean hands doctrine. The case was not one involv-
ing a player voluntarily surrendering his amateur status and turn-
ing professional, which would not in itself be illegal or inequitable.
128. New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1961). The "Mara" referred
to in the quote is Wellington Mara, owner of the New York Giants.
129. Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36,42 (10th Cir. 1966).
130. Id.
Rather it was one in which a player tried to turn professional and,
with the club's agreement to keep the contract secret, attempted to
present to the public the false image that he was still an amateur.
The inequitable conduct is not to be found in turning professional
but in attempting to defraud the public into believing that one is
not professional and in furtively violating the rules of interscholas-
tic competition. Further, the court continually refers to the legal
rights of the parties as a standard by which to judge whether or
not the conduct was inequitable. The clean hands doctrine, how-
ever, is to be measured by equitable, not legal, standards.131 Thus,
even contracts which were made within the bounds of the law
have been declared unenforceable at equity under the clean hands
doctrine. 132 Any factual distinction which the court alluded to as
existing between the Neely and Giants cases can only be found in
the fact that Flowers actually did play in the Sugar Bowl in spite
of being ineligible whereas Neely's signing of a professional con-
tract was discovered1 33 before the Gator Bowl and thus he was de-
clared ineligible to play. Although less harm to the school and
public interest ensues when a secret contract is discovered prior
to a team's disqualification, any contention that the distinction be-
tween being caught and not being caught at inequitable conduct is
determinative of whether to apply the clean hands doctrine would
be a circumvention of the equitable principle that conduct should
be judged by intention and not by outward appearances.
13 4
Further, the idea offered by the Neely court that there should
be no blanket rule invalidating all secret contracts encourages fur-
ther secret signings and implicates the court in the questionable
dealings. The maxim should be applied not for the benefit of any
particular defendant but as a protection of the court's integrity
and the public interest. It is suggested that the best policy would
be a refusal on the part of all courts, by application of the clean
hands doctrine, to enforce secret contracts. Such a policy would
virtually eliminate the serious problems which have been caused
recently by secret contracts. 135 Once professional teams realized
that contracts written under such circumstances could not be en-
131. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavation Co.,
290 U.S. 240 (1933); J. POMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 400 (5th ed.
1941).
132. Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 974 (M.D.N.C.
1969); Schaeffer v. Jones, 193 Pa. 529, 143 A. 197 (1928).
133. The contract was not announced by Houston but was somehow
discovered by the press and it was their reports which led to Neely's
being declared ineligible by the National Collegiate Athletic Association.
Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1966).
134. J. POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 378 (5th ed. 1941).
135. In the 1971 National Collegiate Athletic Association Basketball
Tournament, for example, two of the top four teams, Villanova and West-
ern Kentucky, were stripped of their standings and ordered to return all
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forced, it seems doubtful that they would persist in furtively car-
rying on early negotiations. Thus the policy would protect not
only the integrity of the courts which would no longer have to
hear disputes arising out of disreputable dealings, but also the pub-
lic which would no longer be victim to deceit.
B. League Rules Barring Undergraduates
In contrast to the situation of senior athletes who find too
many teams desirous of their services, an athlete whose original
class is not due to graduate for at least another year may find
that, although he has the ability to be a star in the professional
leagues, no team will sign him because the league prohibits teams
from employing undergraduates. The NBA's elibibility rule3 6 was
attacked by Spencer Haywood as a violation of the Sherman Act
in that it constituted a group boycott. 137 This section will examine
the decision of the district court in that case and discuss how the
ruling might effect the eligibility rules of football and whether
changes made by the basketball leagues in their eligibility rules are
sufficient to evade the impact of the holding.
Spencer Haywood was an All-American basketball player in
high school and at Trinidad Junior College and led the United
States basketball team to a gold medal in the 1968 Olympics in
which he was named the outstanding player. After the 1968 Olym-
pics Haywood enrolled at the University of Detroit where he again
was named an All-American basketball player for the 1968-69 sea-
son, his sophomore year. In the summer of 1969, Haywood decided
not to return to college and signed a contract to play professional
basketball with the Denver Rockets. 138 After being named "Rookie
of the Year" and "Most Valuable Player" in the ABA for the 1969-
70 season, Haywood became embroiled in a contract dispute with
the Rockets' 3 9 and informed them that he would no longer play for
gate receipt shares for using players who had signed secret contracts
with the ABA. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1972, at 47, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1972, at 50, col. 6.
136. NBA By-Laws, § 2.05 as quoted in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
137. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
138. The ABA, of which Denver is a member, also had a rule de-
claring players ineligible until four years after they had entered college
but it was decided that such a rule would impose a hardship on Hay-
wood and was, therefore, waived by the league. Id.
139. The exact facts of this dispute are not pertinent to this section.
It is sufficient to note that Haywood's contract with Denver was to be
for $1.9 Million dollars and was held by the court to provide actual
compensation of $394,000 and therefore Denver was denied its request that
Denver. On December 28, 1970 Haywood signed a six year contract
to play for the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA. At this time how-
ever, he had been out of high school for only three years and his
college class had not graduated. Thus Haywood was ineligible to
play in the NBA under rule 2.05 of its by-laws:
A person who has not completed high school or who has
completed high school but has not entered college, shall
not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA]
until four years after he has been graduated or four years
after his original high school class has been graduated, as
the case may be, nor may the future services of any such
person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise re-
served. Similarly, a person who has entered college but
is no longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or
to be a Player until the time when he would have first be-
come eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any
negotiations or agreements with any such person during
such period shall be null and void and shall confer no
rights to the services of such person at any time there-
after.140
When Haywood first began playing for the Supersonics, other
teams in the league objected that he was ineligible under league
rules and an official protest was filed after every game in which
Haywood appeared. 14I Finally, after several teams announced their
intent to sue Seattle, 142 the NBA Board of Governors voted to
seek drastic penalties against Seattle including expulsion, if it per-
sisted in using Haywood.143  Thus, when Denver sued Haywood
and his agent All-Pro Management, Inc. for Haywood's violation of
his contract with it, Haywood filed a cross-claim against the NBA
charging them with conducting a group boycott against him in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. 4 Since the NBA season was already
a restraining order be issued to prevent Haywood from playing else-
where. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
140. NBA By-Laws § 2.05 as quoted in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
141. An official protest is a formal action whereby the coach or
general manager appeals to the commissioner that his team was deprived
of a victory in a game by actions of either the officials or the other team
which were in violation of league rules.
142. Chicago and Portland announced intent to sue Seattle for using
an ineligible player. Portland's grievance seems to have been that, had
Seattle not signed Haywood, he would have been available for them to
draft when he became eligible in the 1971 draft. Chicago announced
plans to sue Seattle for $600,000 after Chet Walker was injured in a game
between Chicago and Seattle, claiming the injury to Walker was due to
Haywood's presence. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, at 45, col. 1. After the NBA
was enjoined from barring Haywood, these disputes were settled out of
court. Seattle was allowed to keep Haywood but had to pay a $200,000
fine to the league. All suits and protests were withdrawn with preju-
dice. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1971, at 51, col. 1.





underway and approaching the playoff games for the champion-
ship, Haywood asked for a preliminary injunction to restrain the
NBA from preventing his playing for the Seattle Supersonics.
This preliminary injunction was granted.145 The injunction was
stayed on appeal but reinstated by Justice Douglas acting as Circuit
Justice for the Ninth Circuit. The case was then remanded for
consideration of whether the eligibility rules were in violation of
the Sherman Act. 146 On remand, the NBA did not contend that
Haywood was unqualified to play in the league but merely de-
fended its right to exclude him under its eligibility rules. Further
it was argued that the rules were financially necessary to basket-
ball as a business enterprise and that they were necessary to guar-
antee that each prospective professional basketball player be given
the opportunity to complete four years of college before joining
the professional ranks.14 7 Haywood, on the other hand, argued
that the real purpose of the rules was to provide the professional
leagues with a cheap "farm-system"'14 and that the effect of the
rules was a group boycott on the part of the NBA against Hay-
wood and all other qualified undergraduates.
149
Haywood's argument that the rules effected a boycott was ac-
cepted by the court, which went on to discuss the harms from such
a boycott,
Application of the four-year college rule constitutes a "pri-
mary" concerted refusal to deal wherein the actors at one
level of a trade pattern [NBA team members] refuse to
deal with an actor at another level [those ineligible under
the NBA's four-year college rule].
145. Id.
146. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
147. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971). It is important to notice here that the league
speaks only of the "opportunity" of getting an education and not the actual
obtaining of a degree. This is because the league rules, in fact, are not
educational requirements but are based on the mere passage of time since
the player graduated from high school. Thus many players merely put in
time at schools and then go into professional basketball without getting a
degree. This fact has led some to argue that Haywood was correct in
his contention that the rules are merely designed to allow use of the
colleges as a cheap farm system. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 26, 1971, at
28, col. 1.
148. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The term "farm system" commonly refers to the
practice developed in professional athletics of developing the skills of
young players by placing them on affiliated minor league teams where the
skill level required is not as great. Such teams are usually found in
smaller cities and towns and are less expensive to operate.
149. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
The harm resulting from a "primary" boycott such as
this is three fold. First, the victim of the boycott is injured
by being excluded from the market he seeks to enter. Sec-
ond, competition in the market in which the victim at-
tempts to sell his services is injured. Third, by pooling
their economic power, the individual members of the NBA
have, in effect, established their own private government.
Of course, this is true only where the members of the com-
bination possess market power in a degree approaching
a shared monopoly. This is uncontested in the present
case.1 5
The court then focused on whether such a boycott was in violation
of the Sherman Act:
Before a concerted refusal to deal can be illegal under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, two threshold elements must
be present: (1) there must be some effect on "trade or
commerce among the several States," and (2) there must
be sufficient agreement to constitute a "contract, combi-
nation * * * or conspiracy." 15 U.S.C. § 1.
It is uncontested that both of these elements are pres-
ent in the instant case. The NBA operates teams in sev-
enteen of the major metropolitan areas of the United
States. It schedules games in numerous states and receives
television and radio revenue from nationwide broadcasts
of its games. It is thus clear that the NBA conducts its
business in such a manner as to constitute interstate com-
merce. Furthermore, the members of the NBA have
agreed, through their constitution and by-laws, not to deal
with those persons described by Sections 2.05 and 6.03 of
their by-laws.151
Having determined that the activities of the NBA constituted a
"primary" boycott and that the threshold requirements of illegality
under the Sherman Act had been met, the court next considered
the argument that the NBA's rules were economically necessary
and, therefore, exempt from the Sherman Act under the rule of
reason.15 2 The court conceded that the rule of reason had been
used by the Supreme Court to allow certain commercially neces-
sary practices to continue even though they violated the technical
requirements of the Sherman Act. The court also noted, however,
that some practices were too complex to be determined under the
rule of reason and were illegal per se:
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recog-
nized these difficulties and has declared that with regard
to certain practices the problems of making adequate eco-
nomic determinations and setting appropriate guidelines
are so complex that they simply outweigh the very limited
benefits deriving from those practices and have declared
150. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
151. Id. at 1062.
152. Id. at 1063. For an explanation of the "rule of reason," see
note 194 and accompanying text infra.
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them to be illegal per se. A group boycott is one such
practice.1 "S
Because the eligibility rules effected a group boycott by the NBA
the rules were declared illegal per se. 1 " Accordingly, the court
noted that even the possibility offered by the league that the pur-
pose of the rules was to provide an opportunity for education pro-
vided no excuse:
However commendable this desire may be, this court
is not in a position to say that this consideration should
override the objective of fostering economic competition
which is embodied in the antitrust laws. If such a determi-
nation is to be made, it must be made by Congress and
not the courts.15"
After a lengthy discussion, the court granted Haywood's request
for partial summary judgment and ordered the NBA not to inter-
fere with Haywood's playing for the Seattle Supersonics. 1 "
Reaction to the order forbidding the NBA from enforcing its
eligibility rules against undergraduates came quickly from the
league itself and from other professional sports leagues with similar
rules. The NFL, which has even stricter eligibility rules, requiring
completion of college eligibility or a five year lapse, 157 announced
that the rules would not be changed and that undergraduates
would still be ineligible to play professional football in the NFL.1' 8
These rules are virtually the same as the rules declared illegal by
the court in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.159 and it
153. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1063 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
154. Id. at 1067.
155. Id. at 1066. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in its report of
the bill which would exempt the proposed merger of the NBA and ABA
has indicated that there may soon be congressional action on the matter
of the drafting of players who have not completed college:
The Committee views the practice of drafting high school or col-
lege students . . . by professional basketball clubs in cases other
than instances of genuine economic hardship warranting termina-
tion of academic pursuits as a serious interference with the edu-
cation of student athletes and a threat to school and college ath-
letic programs. The Committee understands that once the com-
bination of the two leagues is accomplished, the clubs of the
merged leagues will discontinue this practice.
Sen. Rep. No. 92-1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1972). Senator Ervin dis-
sented from this view, arguing that an athlete's career is too short to
make him wait until his college class graduates before playing profes-
sional ball. Sen. Rep. No. 92-1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1972).
156. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1067 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
157. Constitution and By-Laws for the NFL, Art. XII (1972).
158. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1971, at 39, col. 1.
159. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
would seem that, if challenged in court, they would also be de-
clared in violation of the Sherman Act.
1 0°
The NBA responded to the ruling of the court by changing its
eligibility rules slightly. The basic premise still remains that a
player who has not yet completed his college eligibility or who has
not been out of high school for four years is ineligible to play in
the NBA. Under the revision, however, a player can petition to
have his case considered a hardship case and have the eligibility
rules waived in his favor.16 1 The determination of whether or not
to waive the rule is based on considerations of "financial condi-
tion, his family, his academic record or lack of it, and his ability to
obtain employment in another field.' 16 2 If the player is successful
in his petition he will be eligible to be drafted in a special "hardship
draft." These revisions make the NBA rules basically the same
as those under which Haywood entered the ABA. The fact that
the ABA rules were not declared illegal in the Denver Rockets
case does not necessarily indicate that they are not in violation of
the Sherman Act, but merely reflects the fact that they were not
challenged by Haywood. The rules still affect a group boycott
against players who have not completed their college eligibility or
been out of high school for four years. The legality of the rules,
therefore, hinges on whether the hardship hearing is sufficient pro-
tection from the group boycott for purposes of the Sherman Act.
In Deesen v. Professional Golfers Association of America"6 '
and in Molinas v. NBA, ' 4 the power of an organized athletic asso-
ciation to exclude members after a hearing was upheld despite
claims that such expulsion constituted a violation of the Sherman
Act. There are basic factual distinctions between these cases and
Denver Rockets, however, which would make these decisions im-
proper precedent for a holding that the four-year rules are legal
as long as there is a "hardship hearing." First, in both cases, the
plaintiff was not a person who had been denied admission to an
athletic association but was, rather, a member of an athletic asso-
ciation who had been declared ineligible for further competition.
Thus, the action on the part of the defendants was not a primary
boycott at all but rather a reasonable enforcement of disciplinary
rules. Second, and more importantly, the ineligibility in each case
was based directly on matters relevant to the plaintiff's athletic
160. This contention is strengthened by the fact that the NFL is the
only major professional football league in America and thus any player
not eligible to play for it simply cannot play whereas a player rejected
by the NBA might still have been able, as Haywood was, to play in the
ABA.
161. Statement by Comm'r. Walter Kennedy of the NBA, N.Y. Times,
June 25, 1971, at 24, col. 6.
162. Id.
163. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
164. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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ability. Deesen was dropped from the rolls of approved tourna-
ment players because he was unable to win more than $240.35 in
seven years, never averaging better than 76 strokes per eighteen
holes.' 5 The court held that the Professional Golfer's Association
had to limit the number of players in tournaments out of physical
necessity and that it had, through the adoption of try-out systems,
adopted reasonable rules for that purpose. The eligibility rules, on
the other hand, are not designed to limit numbers for administra-
tive reasons through qualification by ability, but are simply rules
designed to prevent certain parties from even demonstrating their
ability to play professional basketball.
In the Molinas case, the plaintiff had admitted to gambling on
games while a member of the Fort Wayne Pistons of the NBA.
The commissioner of the league ordered him suspended for life,
labelling him a "cancer on the league" which must be excised.166
The suit by Molinas charging the NBA with violation of the Sher-
man Act was held barred by the statute of limitations, 167 but the
court in dicta declared that the power of the league to expel gam-
blers was not a violation of the Sherman Act:
With respect to plaintiff's suspension from the league in
January of 1954, and the subsequent refusal by the league
to reinstate him, plaintiff has patently failed to establish
an unreasonable restraint of trade within the meaning of
the anti-trust laws. A rule, and a corresponding clause,
providing for the suspension of those who place wagers
on games in which they are participants seems not only
reasonable, but necessary for the survival of the league.108
In contrast to these two cases, the hardship hearing is not a dis-
ciplinary proceeding for the protection of the league but a hearing
to determine whether to grant permission to even try out for the
league. Further, the standards of eligibility were moral integrity
in the Molinas case and physical ability in the Deesen case, both of
which are directly relevant to fitness for the sport. A hardship
rule, however, determines eligibility on such fortuitous circum-
stances as whether or not a player comes from an affluent family,
a factor which certainly has no bearing on his moral or physical
ability to play professional basketball.
The Supreme Court has indicated in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange'9 that there may be an exception to the per se illegality
165. Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 167 (1966).
166. Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
167. Id. at 243.
168. Id.
169. 371 U.S. 342 (1963).
of group boycotts. It seems unlikely, however, that the hardship
rules would be legal under this exception as it was interpreted by
the Denver Rockets court:
Thus, Silver seems to envision the application of the per se
rule to group boycott cases, with one narrow exception.
A factual situation falling into this exception would be
governed by the "rule of reason." To qualify for this ex-
ception it would have to be shown that:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation,
or otherwise"...
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accom-
plish an end consistent with the policy justifying self-reg-
ulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is
no more extensive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards
which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which
furnishes a basis for judicial review.
17 0
It is obvious that the hardship rule does not come within the
Silver exception because there is no legislative mandate that au-
thorizes professional basketball leagues to regulate themselves, and
even if there were, the procedural safeguards supposedly provided
in the hardship hearing are perhaps arbitrary since the standards
for granting a waiver under the rule are based not on matters rele-
vant to ability or fitness for professional basketball but on totally
extraneous and fortuitous circumstances.
It is suggested that the modification of the eligibility rules
to provide for a hardship hearing has succeeded neither in bringing
the eligibility rules within the holdings of the Deesen and Molinas
cases nor within the exception to the per se illegality rule suggested
by the Supreme Court in the Silver case. Rather, it is suggested
that the rules still effect a group boycott in violation of the Sher-
man Act. The fact that the group boycotted has shrunk from all
basketball players who have not been out of high school at least
four years to all basketball players, other than those few who meet
arbitrary standards of hardship set by the league, who have not
been out of high school for four years, is not enough to exclude the
boycott from the sanctions of the Sherman Act, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court has held that a concerted refusal to deal even with
only one individual may be a violation of the Sherman Act.
171
V. CHANGES IN ATHLETIC CONTRACTS
Perhaps the single unifying aspect of suits arising during a bid-
ding war is that all have arisen out of standard form contracts pre-
pared by the club, which the athletes must either accept or reject
as a whole.1'72 Because the contract has been prepared by the club,
170. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
171. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
172. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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it contains the special clauses already discussed 173 which give the
club an extraordinary amount of power over the athlete, in addi-
tion to the power already inherent in the fact that the clubs are
members of a league which controls all, or nearly all, opportunities
for professional employment in the athlete's chosen field. Tradi-
tionally, athletes having signed these standard form contracts have
not discovered the full impact of the contracts until they attempted
to join another team or league. Unfortunately, such discovery was
usually made clearest by means of a court order forbidding this in-
tended "jump." Recently, however, substantial changes in the na-
ture of the contractual relations between the player and the club
have been proposed. In each of the major sports this change has
been initiated in a different manner, but in all sports the proposals
have focused on modification of the reserve or option clause. This
section will examine the different modifications and discuss how
the changes affect the rights of an athlete seeking to market his
skills.
A. The NFL Option Clause
After escalating to the point where All-American football play-
ers could command contracts in excess of a half million dollars for
turning professional, the bidding war between the NFL and the
AFL came to an end in 1967 when the two leagues merged under
special congressional authorization.' 74 The basic option clause has
been retained in the standard player contract used by the merged
league, but the ability of a player to actually become free to sign
with any club willing to meet his terms after he has played out his
option has been severely limited by the adoption of a requirement
that any new club signing the player must provide compensation
to his former club.175 This rule has been attacked recently in a
suit filed by the NFL Players Association against the NFL,
176
charging the league with violating the Sherman Act by enforce-
ment of its rule.
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173. See § II in text supra.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1967); see note 3 supra.
175. Constitution and By-Laws for the NFL, Art. XII, § 12.1(H) (1972).
Because of the extraordinary amount of power which this rule gives the
commissioner, the rule has been called "the Rozelle Rule" by the players
in their suit against the league. Complaint at 10, Mackey v. NFL, Civil
No. 4-72-277 (D. Minn., filed May 23, 1972).
176. Mackey v. NFL, Civil No. 4-72-277 (D. Minn., filed May 23, 1972).
177. Complaint, Mackey v. NFL, Civil No. 4-72-277 (D. Minn., filed
The option clause in the Standard Player Contract of the NFL
reads:
The Club, may, by sending notice in writing to the Player,
on or before the first day of May following the football
season referred to in paragraph 1 hereof, renew this con-
tract for a further term of one (1) year on the same terms
as provided by this contract, except that (1) the Club may
fix the rate of compensation to be paid by the Club to the
Player during said further term, which rate of compensa-
tion shall not be less than ninety percent (90%) of the
sum set forth in paragraph 3 hereof and shall be payable
in installments during the football season in such fur-
ther term as provided in paragraph 3; and (2) after such
renewal this contract shall not include a further option
to the Club to renew this contract. The phrase rate of
compensation as above used shall not include bonus pay-
ments or payments of any nature whatsoever and shall
be limited to the precise sum set forth in paragraph 3
hereof .... 178
Even though the affect of such a clause is that a player can sever
relations with a club and become free to deal with others only at
great expense and risk,179 the validity of the option clause has been
upheld by the courts.18 0 The Constitution of the NFL, which is
incorporated by reference into the player contracts, however, con-
tains an article which makes it far more difficult for the player to
play out his option and join another team:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has
expired, shall thereupon become a free agent and shall no
longer be considered a member of the team of that club
following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever
a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, there-
after signed a contract with a different club in the League,
then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been
concluded between the two League clubs, the Commis-
sioner may name and then award to the former club one
or more players from the Active, Reserve or Selection list
(including future selection choices) of the acquiring club
as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and
May 1, 1972). This complaint is filed in two counts. The first names
thirty-four players as plaintiffs and all of the clubs of the NFL, the
Commissioner and the league itself as defendants and charges them with
violation of the Sherman Act by application of the Rozelle Rule. The
second count names ten players as plaintiffs and the same defendants as
the first court and alleges that each player has played out his option and
became a free agent but because of the application of the rule the players
have been unable to sign on with new teams. Each player alleged that
this is due to an illegal combination on the part of the clubs by applica-
tion of the Rozelle Rule and the players pray for treble damage under the
provisions of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
178. NFL Standard Player Contract, § 10 (1972).
179. See note 13 supra.
180. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W2d 37
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); see § HA in text supra.
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equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be
final and conclusive.
18 1
The most notable example of the effect of this rule is to be
found in the case of Dave Parks. While with the San Francisco
49ers, Parks was an all-pro receiver but he became unhappy with
the team and played out his option. When the New Orleans Saints
signed him to a contract, Pete Rozelle ordered that they surrender
their 1968 first round draft choice to the 49ers and also granted to
San Francisco the first round draft choice of New Orleans for 1969.
First-round draft choices are extremely valuable and this price ex-
acted by the commissioner is an indication that signing a suppos-
edly free agent who has played out his option may cost the team
more than the player is worth. 18 2 Thus a player who has played
out his option must now convince a new team that he is worth not
only the salary he is seeking but also the loss of any player on the
new team which the commissioner, in his total and unappealable
discretion, considers to be adequate compensation to the old
team.18 3 The severe restriction which this puts on a player's actual
ability to play out his option and go to another team is reflected in
the fact that few players ever play out their options and, that,
since the Dave Parks case, no player of all-league caliber has played
out his option and gone to a new team.8 4 Not only does this rule
impinge upon the ability of a player to join a new team, but it
also gives his present team an unconscionable advantage at the
bargaining table. This advantage lies in the fact that if the player
refuses to accept any offer the club makes, the worst that can hap-
pen to the club is that they will receive the same services for an
additional year for 10% less and then will receive "compensation"
from any new team which the player may join. It is hard to
imagine any owner giving in to a player's salary demands at the
threat of such consequences. It is suggested that the total effect
of the Rozelle Rule is, therefore, a severe restraint of trade.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in part, "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
181. Constitution and By-Laws for the NFL, Art. XII, § 12.1 (H) (1972)
[hereinafter cited as the Rozelle Rule].
182. An important factor to consider here is that the poorer a team's
record is the better its draft choice will probably be since the teams pick
in inverse order of finish. Thus the teams that need players the most will
have to risk the most valuable draft choices to sign those players.
183. The Rozelle Rule, supra note 181.
184. SPORTS ILLUSTRAT D, May 1, 1972, at 29. See also B. PARRISH, THEY
CALL IT A GAME (1972).
eign nations, is declared to be illegal . ,,181 As noted in Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 8 6 two threshold require-
ments to a showing of illegality under the Sherman Act are an ef-
fect on interstate commerce and sufficient agreement to constitute
a contract, combination or conspiracy.' 87 In Radovich v. NFL,
188
the Supreme Court declared "the volume of interstate business in-
volved in organized professional football places it within the provi-
sions of the [Sherman] Act.' 1 89 The question of whether the by-
laws of the league constituted a contract for the purposes of the
Sherman Act was decided in United States v. NFL. 90 In sustain-
ing the government's challenge to by-laws of the league relating to
broadcasting of games, the court held: "The by-laws have been
agreed to by all the League members and are binding upon all of
them. They clearly constitute a contract within the meaning of
the word as it is used in the Sherman Act."' 91
In early cases interpreting the Sherman Act, the mere showing
that an act was in restraint of trade and a meeting of the threshold
requirements of conspiracy and effect on interstate commerce was
sufficient for a declaration that the act complained of was illegal un-
der the Sherman Act. 92 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
9 3
the Supreme Court recognized the fact that some restraints of trade
were necessary for a healthy business climate and narrowed the
prohibition of the Sherman Act to unreasonable restraints of
trade. 94 Under this construction of the Sherman Act, if the con-
tention that the Rozelle Rule constitutes a violation of the Sherman
Act is to be sustained, it must be shown not only that it consti-
tutes a restraint of trade, but also that such restraint is unreason-
able. The unreasonableness can be shown either by evidence that
it would have been illegal at common law' 9 or by a showing that
the restraint in this case is similar to other restraints forbidden
by the courts as violations of the Sherman Act.
A key factor to be considered in the determination of whether
the restraint effected by the Rozelle Rule would be illegal under
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
186. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see § IVB supra.
187. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
188. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
189. Id. at 451.
190. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
191. Id. at 321.
192. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1896).
193. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
194. Id. at 60. This view of the Sherman Act has come to be known
as the rule of reason. But see § IVB supra (group boycotts are still illegal
per se).
195. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377




common law rules is that, by the very terms of the Rozelle Rule,
a player who has played out his option has "become a free agent,
and shall no longer be considered a member of the team of that
club."'19 Thus the player's relationships with his former club have
terminated and the club is being compensated for the loss of a
player no longer employed by it. Corbin 97 notes that restraints
on an employee after his term of employment were generally in-
valid at common law, except where the employee has acquired
trade secrets, but that the development of exceptional or unique
skill was not enough to justify such restraints. 98 Nor would the
fact that the club acquiring the player is being made a stronger
competitor be sufficient justification for the restraints.
Sufficient justification is not thought to exist if the
harm caused by service to another consists merely in the
fact that the new employer becomes a more efficient com-
petitor just as the first employer did through having a
competent and efficient employee.1 99
Because the Rozelle Rule effects a severe restraint on an em-
ployee who has quit his former job,2 00 it would seem that under
the common law principles delineated by Corbin the Rozelle Rule
would constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade. By applica-
tion of the rule of reason set forth in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,2 01 the rule would also be illegal under the Sherman Act.
A more direct method of showing that this restraint of trade is
in violation of the Sherman Act is illustrating that the means of
achieving the restraint and the effect it has are substantially sim-
ilar to restraints which have already been declared in violation of
the Sherman Act. Important aspects to be considered in this light
are that the restraint is effected by giving the commissioner "final
and conclusive" 20 2 discretion in naming the players who will go to
the original club; and that the effect is a freeze in the labor pool
of the league in that a player can usually leave his team only by
retirement or by trade.
In Anderson v. Shipowners Association,202 a sailor sued to en-
join the association from continuing the practice of requiring all
196. Rozelle Rule, supra note 181.
197. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394 (1962).
198. Id. at 99.
199. Id. at 100. For a leading common law case on such restraints, see
Hubert Morris Ltd. v. Sacelby, [1916] A.C. 688 (H.L.).
200. See, e.g., SPoRTs ILLuSTRATED, May 1, 1972, at 29; B. PAzeusH, TBsY
CALL IT A GAM (1972).
201. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
202. Rozelle Rule, supra note 181.
203. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
seamen in the area to register for employment. Upon registration
each seaman received a number and had to wait his turn before he
could be employed by any ship belonging to an association member.
Once his number was called, the shipowner had to give him what-
ever job was available without regard to qualification, and the
seaman had to accept the job. The plaintiff charged that this was
a violation of the Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint of
trade. In reversing the dismissal of the complaint,204 the Supreme
Court held that each individual shipowner had surrendered his
freedom to carry on business according to his choice and discretion
by allowing the final decisions of employment to be governed by
the association, and that the practice violated the Sherman Act.20 5
That the owners of teams in the league have surrendered their dis-
cretion as to employment of a player who has played out his op-
tion to the "final and conclusive" 206 judgment of the Commissioner,
seems sufficient to classify this restraint as a violation of the Sher-
man Act.
In Nichols v. Spencer International Press20 7 an encyclopedia
salesman sued his former employer and another encyclopedia com-
pany, Crowell-Collier, which refused to hire him, alleging that the
two publishers had entered into a "no-switching" agreement
whereby each agreed not to hire any former employee of the other
for six months after termination of employment. The plaintiff
contended that the agreement was in violation of the Sherman Act.
The court held that, although the Sherman Act was not designed to
regulate employment practices, it was intended to promote compe-
tition and where agreements such as this had the effect of cutting
down competition, they would be declared illegal.208 In a case 2 9
involving a similar "no-switching" agreement among magazine
sales agencies, the contention of the FTC that such agreements
were in violation of the Sherman Act was upheld on the grounds
that such agreements freeze the labor supply in that employees are
hesitant to leave one job for fear of being unable to find employ-
ment with another company.210 The freeze on the labor supply
within the NFL effected by the compensation requirement is re-
flected in the fact that, although the total number of players on
the active rosters of clubs in the league each season was over one
thousand, the number of players actually playing out their op-
tions and joining another team in the five seasons between 1966 and
204. Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 10 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 272
U.S. 359 (1926).
205. Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 365 (1926).
206. Rozelle Rule at 44.
207. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
208. Id. at 335-6.
209. Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
210. Id. at 658.
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1970 was only eleven.2 11 Under the reasoning of the Nichols v.
Spencer International Press212 and Union Circulation v. FTC,213 this
effect of the compensation requirement would also be sufficient to
classify it as a violation of the Sherman Act.
It would seem that the requirement that an acquiring club
make compensation to the player's former club is, by the reasoning
of the cases cited, not only in restraint of trade, but also so un-
reasonable as to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. It is
suggested, therefore, that the contentions of the NFL Players' As-
sociation are valid and that the compensation requirement should
be abolished so that a player can actually be free to join a new
club after playing out his option.
B. Arbitration Proceedings under the WHA Uniform Player's Con-
tract
In 1972, a new professional hockey league was formed to chal-
lenge the virtual monopoly which has been enjoyed by the NHL.
In order to establish itself quickly, the league began offering star
players from the NHL contracts paying unheard of sums. The
fabulous salaries being paid by the new league were not the only
startling innovation it used to attract players, however. In order
to make it attractive for players to join the WHA the league
produced a uniform player's contract which contained neither an
option nor a reserve clause.21 4 This section will discuss the alter-
native method of leaving a team offered by the WHA.
As noted earlier,2 15 the usual professional sports contract runs
for a term of one year with an option to the club to automatically
renew for a further year by offering the player a stated percentage
of the first year's salary. The new contract produced by the WHA
runs for a term of one year with no option to renew. 21 6 Instead,
an arbitration system is provided to aid the player and club in
reaching settlement on a new contract or, failing that, to aid the
player in joining a new team.
2 17
211. SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1972, at 29. See also B. PARRisH, THEY
CALL IT A GAME (1972).
212. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (employment practices which stifled
competition held in violation of the Sherman Act).
213. 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957) (freeze on labor pool within industry
held violation of Sherman Act).
214. WHA Uniform Player's Contract (1972).
215. See § II and accompanying footnotes supra.
216. WHA Uniform Player's Contract, § 10 (1972).
217. WHA Uniform Player's Contract, § 16 (1972):
16. Player Negotiations,
The advantages that such a clause has over the option clause
or reserve clause are apparent. Perhaps most important is that the
bargaining strength of the player is greatly increased. As noted
in the discussion of the NFL compensation requirement,2 18 a player
faced with an option clause coupled with a compensation require-
ment has very little bargaining power. Under the WHA's arbitra-
tion system, however, the player can threaten to leave if his terms
are not met and can begin negotiating with a new team the next
day. Further, unlike the basketball contract which expires a week
before the season begins, the player is free to begin negotiations
with a new club well in advance of the opening day of the season.
16.1 If the Player and the Club fail to sign a new contract for
the season following the termination of this contract before
June 1, the arbitration procedure outlined in this Paragraph 16
shall automatically go into effect.
16.2 Arbitration Procedure
16.21 On or before July 4 following the last playing season
of this contract, in the event the player and the Club
fail to enter into a new contract, the Player and the
Club shall each appoint one person to hear and deter-
mine the dispute preventing the signing of such new
contract. If these persons are able to react agreement
on or before July 15 of the year of the dispute, no
further proceedings are necessary. If they are unable
to reach agreement on or before that date, then they
shall immediately select a third impartial arbitrator
whose decision shall be reached on or before July 31
of the year of the dispute.
16.22 Player and Club agree to arbitrate in good faith.
16.23 If the Player and the Club agree that the decision of
the impartial arbitrator is fair, a new contract will be
executed embodying the terms of his decision.
16.24 If either the Player or the Club disagree with the
decision of the impartial arbitrator, they may refuse to
enter into a new contract and the Player automatically
enters into a special secondary draft pool on August 1
of the year of the dispute.
16.3 Secondary Draft
16.31. Once a Player enters the secondary draft pool, he may
not sign a contract with any other club until he is
drafted.
16.32. The League will hold, in accordance with its normal
draft procedure, a "secondary draft" on or about August
15 of each year. Teams will draft in the same order
as in the normal yearly draft.
16.33 The Club with which the Player was under contract
immediately prior to the secondary draft may not draft
the player in this manner.
16.4 Subsequent Secondary Drafts
In the event the player and the club that drafted him
in the secondary draft are unable to reach an agree-
ment by September 1, the Player will enter a pool for
a new secondary draft, the date of which will be deter-
mined by the League President.
16.5 Costs of Arbitration
The costs of the arbitration, including costs expended
by the President and his staff as his services are re-
quired, will be borne equally by the Club and the
Player, and the Player hereby authorizes his employing
club to deduct his share of the expenses from the first





A disadvantage to the player lies in the fact that, whereas a
player who has played out his option supposedly becomes free to
negotiate with any other team in the league, under these arbitra-
tion proceedings a player who fails to come to an agreement with
his present club can only negotiate with the team that selects him
in the "secondary draft." The legality of this method of changing
teams of course depends upon whether a draft system is a proper
employment method or is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The theory behind the draft is that unlimited competition is not
good for professional sports. The adverse effects of unlimited com-
petition were discussed in United States v. NFL:
2 1 9
Thus, the net effects of allowing unrestricted business
competition among the clubs are likely to be, first, the
creation of greater and greater inequalities in the strength
of the teams; second, the weaker teams being driven out of
business; and third, the destruction of the entire League. 220
In order to prevent imbalance between teams in a league, teams
are not allowed to hire any and all players they wish but, must,
rather select, or "draft," the players with whom they wish to nego-
tiate, such selection to be made in inverse order of league standings.
With the weaker teams selecting first and the stronger teams last,
the theory is that after several years the weaker teams will be-
come stronger by the addition of the more talented players. Al-
though the efficacy of this system is questionable, the type of draft
used by the WHA seems to be a reasonable means of keeping a bal-
ance among the teams and probably would not be held to be in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.22 1 The secondary draft which the
player enters under the WHA is not the ordinary type of draft in
which the player either signs with the team selecting him or does
not play since the league allows a player to refuse to sign with the
selecting team and reenter the secondary draft pool. Conceivably
a player who wanted to play for a first place finisher of the previ-
ous year could keep reentering the pool until he was selected by
that team.
222
219. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
220. Id. at 324.
221. See United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Com-
ment, The Sherman Act: Football's Player Controls-Are They Reason-
able, 6 CAL. WEST. L. Rsv. 133 (1969); Note, The Super Bowl and the Sher-
man Act: Professional Team Sports and the Anti-Trust Laws, 81 tARv.
L. Ruv. 618 (1967).
222. This would, of course, depend upon whether or not a player who
wishes to play in a certain city may be considered as bargaining in good
faith if he refuses to accept an offer of any other team. WHA Uniform
Player's Contract, § 16.22 (1972). It would seem that a player would
It has been held, however, in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.
v. United States,223 that a refusal to deal with a party except on a
standard form contract calling for arbitration of disputes consti-
tutes a violation of the Sherman Act. A significant feature of this
contract was that the decision of the arbitrator was conclusive and
thus the court saw the contract as merely an attempt to suppress
competition under the guise of arbitration:
It may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of
the motion picture industry, but when under the guise of
arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements which
unreasonably suppress normal competition their action be-
comes illegal.
22 4
There are several key distinctions to be made between this case and
the arbitration system proposed by the WHA. The most impor-
tant is, of course, that the arbitration in the WHA is not final and
conclusive and thus the player is free to reject it. Moreover, the
effect of the contract offered by the WHA is not to suppress normal
competition, but to increase the ability of the player to change
teams in comparison with the ability of other players in other
leagues. Additionally, because the player is not bound for an op-
tion season, he may simply reject the arbitration system completely
by switching leagues at the start of the new season.
225
The arbitration system contained in the Uniform Players' Con-
tract of the WHA is a significant improvement from the player's
viewpoint in that it grants to the player greater bargaining power
if he wishes to stay with his present team and also gives the player
greater freedom to leave that team if he so desires.
C. The Proposed Merger of the NBA and ABA
The bidding war between the NBA and ABA came to an un-
easy truce on May 8, 1971 when the two leagues announced their
intention to seek congressional exemption from the Sherman Act
for a merger.226 This was the method used by the AFL and NFL
in 1966 to end their bidding war.227 Unlike the football leagues,
which experienced little difficulty in getting approval for the mer-
have the right to choose which team he will play for. In order to pre-
vent the player from missing any playing time by having to resubmit his
name to repeated secondary drafts, it may be a good idea for a player to
announce publicly what it is that he is seeking. If this is done only a
team willing to meet the player's offer would be likely to draft him and
thus negotiations would be expedited.
223. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
224. Id. at 43.
225. The term of the contract is only for one year and thus, the
player is free each year to negotiate a new contract. WHA Uniform
Player's Contract § 10 (1972). The arbitration system merely regulates
the player's contract negotiations with the league but does not prevent
his switching leagues. WHA Uniform Player's Contract § 16 (1972).
226. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1971, at 19, col. 1.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1967).
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ger on their own terms, the basketball leagues have been faced
with the opposition of their own players associations which realize
that the effect of a merger would be to limit their bargaining power
and lower their salaries. 228 In large part because of the opposition
of the players, the bill which would allow the merger of the
leagues has been reported out of the Senate judiciary committee
with an amendment which would abolish option or reserve clauses
beyond that contained in a rookie's contract and would do away
with any sort of "compensation" requirement.229
228. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1971, at 57, col 5. The players had earlier
rejected a five-point compromise plan offered by the owners to get the
players to end their opposition to the merger:
(1) All contracts with rookies would be for one year with an op-
tion for another year.
(2) Contracts with veteran players would no longer include ei-
ther an option nor a reserve clause.
(3) Option clauses in existing contracts would, however, remain
in effect.
(4) A player could only begin negotiations with a new team
after his contract, including any option, expired and the old
club could reclaim the player by matching any offer he ac-
cepted.
(5) Any club signing a free agent must make compensation to
his former club, such compensation to be determined by ar-
bitration.
This compromise was rejected on the grounds that the last two provisions
destroyed the effect of the first three. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1971, § V,
at 2.
229. S. Rep. No. 92-1151, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972):
Section 4. (a) Every individual who is already engaged in the
organized professional team sport of basketball in or affecting
interstate commerce has the right to enter into a contract with
any person for the purpose of engaging in such sport with a par-
ticular team without agreeing to permit that person to control
his right, upon the expiration of his contract, to enter into a con-
tract with any person for such purpose, but this subsection shall
not preclude agreement upon a contract containing an option pro-
vision as authorized by subsection (b).
(b) No member club of any professional basketball league that
has been allocated the right of first negotiation with a player
who has not heretofore played professional league basketball may
require such player to enter into a contract of employment for
a term in excess of one year with an option provision for a further
Feriod of one year only. No member club of any professional
eague shall retain, directly or indirectly or by any means or de-
vice whatsoever, any option upon the services of any player be-
yond the termination date contained in his contract of employ-
ment, except for the option provision contained in the first con-
tract of employment and except for an option provision which
may not be part of a uniform player contract and which is in-
dividually negotiated at the discretion of the player after the ef-
fective date hereof for a period of no more than one year after
the term contained in his contract of employment.
(c) Any provision of a contract which requires any such an in-
dividual or player (1) to agree to permit the other party to the
contract to control his right, upon the expiraton of that contract,
to enter into a contract with any other person for the purpose of
engaging in an organized professional team sport of basketball,
If the legislation were to become law in this amended form, the
impact on the rights of a player to sell his services to the highest
bidder would be revolutionary. No longer would a player have to
buy back his right to play for the team of his choice by going
through the process of playing out his option. Instead, like most
businessmen, he would be free to take a new job as soon as his
present contract expired. Further, the player would be abso-
lutely free to deal with any other team and such other teams would
not be required to make any form of compensation to his former
team. Thus viewed, the player would be free each year to negoti-
ate not only with his own team but with every other team in the
league and would be able to sell his services for the highest price.
Even if the legislation is passed in this form, however, there
is some doubt that the leagues will actually use the authority
granted by it to merge. The reluctance is apparently based on the
idea that, by not merging, the leagues will at least be able to con-
tinue the present system of controlling player movement within
each league, the view being that this is better than unrestricted
competition by all teams of both leagues for every player. How-
ever, a close reading of the language of the amendment will make
clear that the leagues cannot retain the option clauses merely by
not merging. The amendment states that "No member of any pro-
fessional basketball league '230 may use option clauses or require
compensation by the acquiring club for a player who has played
out his option. It would seem, then, that the prohibition would
apply to all professional basketball whether in the present two
league set-up or in a merged league.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has dealt with the contractual rights and liabilities
of a professional athlete in today's bidding war from two aspects;
how the athlete can best protect his right to play for the team of
his choice under contracts as they are now written and how those
rights would be effected by certain proposed modifications. Any
conclusions which can be drawn, must, therefore, essentially be
drawn from these two perspectives.
Under the present system of player-club relations, the player
finds himself confronted at best with a two-buyer market or a
duoposony, and often finds only one buyer, or a monoposony. Thus,
or (2) to secure a release from the other party to the contract be-
fore entering into or performing under such a contract with any
other purpose for such purpose, shall be unenforceable.
(d) Any person who deprives, or conspires with any other per-
son to deprive, an individual or player of his rights under sub-
section (a) or (b) shall be deemed guilty of a misdemea-
nor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $50,000,
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
230. Id. at 3.
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any contract which the athlete signs to play with a club is not at
arm's length but rather an adhesion contract dictated by the clubs
containing special clauses such as the "unique skill," "negative cov-
evant" and "option" clauses, all of which are designed to bind a
player to a club until it no longer needs his services. In spite of
the circumstances under which the athlete and the club sign their
contracts, in suits for a player's breach of contract, courts have
spoken of the player's "acceptance" of the terms and the "consider-
ation" given for them as valid reasons for granting the clubs the
equitable relief authorized by the contracts which they have writ-
ten.231 By the trend of modern cases, however, strict enforcement
of the language of an adhesion contract is one which even courts of
law are reluctant to grant.28 2 When it is considered that the
courts in which the clubs seek relief are courts of equity, it is dis-
tressing to find decisions granting injunctions based upon contract
language forced upon an athlete. It is suggested that more consid-
eration should be given by the courts to the onesided nature of
present contract formation between the player and the club.
Rather than relying upon specially prepared clauses in the contract
as sufficient justification for binding a player to a club, it is sug-
gested that courts should refuse to enforce such clauses where they
would cause genuine hardship to a player.
The best protection for the rights of all athletes, however,
would not be piecemeal judicial decisions protecting individual
players in individual sports,2 33 but would be provided by legisla-
tion such as the proposed basketball merger bill doing away with
all option and restrictive clauses. A great problem arising from
such legislation is that it would permit unlimited competition for
players, which may be bad for the league as a whole.2 3 4 It is sug-
gested therefore, that the leagues should be allowed to preserve
competitive balance by an arbitration system similar to that em-
ployed by the WHA as long as the player is free to reject any team
for whom he does not wish to play. This scheme would protect
231. E.g., Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
232. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
377 P.2d 284, 58 Cal. 2d 862 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
233. It is significant to note here that even when courts have in-
tended to protect all the players in a sport, the leagues will react as they
see fit, regardless of the spirit of the decision. See § IVB supra (leagues
persist in barring undergraduates even though the practice has been de-
clared illegal).
234. See § VB supra.
the balance within the league by giving the weaker teams first ne-
gotiating rights but it would also protect the player by allowing
him the final choice of for whom he will actually play. Only under
such legislative protection will the athlete be free, as he should be,
to sell his services to the team of his choice.
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